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Note 
Flexibility of Labor Law. 
The European Discussion and the Example of Germany 
Udo MAYER * 
Dans la plupart des pays européens, on a, ces dernières années, 
assoupli la protection législative de l'emploi, de manière à faciliter à 
l'employeur le recrutement du personnel par divers procédés. Cette 
nouvelle législation n 'offre qu 'une protection de second ordre à ceux 
dont l'engagement n 'est que pour une durée déterminée, aux employés à 
temps partiel, de même qu 'aux personnes dont les services sont proposés 
par des entreprises de personnel temporaire. Le recours à de telles 
catégories de personnel offre, certes, de multiples avantages à l'employeur. 
Par exemple, il diminue ses indemnités de licenciement ; il n 'a pas, non 
plus, à payer un personnel trop considérable dans des périodes de sous-
emploi. Par contre, la libéralisation de l'emploi précaire suscite différents 
problèmes. Elle tend à créer deux classes d'employés. D'une part, il y a 
ceux qui jouissent de la sécurité d'emploi: leur travail est stable, bien 
rémunéré et donne lieu à des avantages sociaux significatifs ; d'autre 
part, il y a le travail de « seconde zone », mal payé, précaire et pratiquement 
dénué d'avantages sociaux. Tels sont les effets de la loi dite, non sans 
euphémisme, Loi en vue de promouvoir l'emploi, adoptée en 1985 en 
R.F.A. 
Les syndicats s'opposent à l'implantation de telles normes d'emploi 
inéquitables. Ils tendent, par voie de négociation collective, à assurer un 
traitement égal pour l'ensemble des travailleurs, en particulier, par la 
réduction du temps de travail. Mais cette politique syndicale pourrait 
bien se révéler impuissante à contrer le fractionnement du travail. Une 
politique gouvernementale favorisant activement l'emploi, y compris le 
retour à une protection véritable de l'emploi, doit la compléter. 
* Professeur à l'Université d'économie et de sciences politiques, Hambourg, R.F.A. Cet 
article a été écrit pendant son séjour comme professeur invité à l'Université Laval. L'auteur 
remercie le professeur Pierre Verge pour son aide et son appui. 
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Introduction 
One of today's most discussed issues in European Labor Law is the claim 
for deregulation of current labor law standards, for more flexibility of employers 
in hiring and firing employees. Many Europeans are impressed by the development 
of the American Labor market, the high growth of jobs and the low unemployment 
rate over the last years considering it as a result of higher flexibility in employee 
staffing in the USA and hence pleading for more deregulation of the existing 
employment law in Europe '. 
But the U.S. has not been the only example that has pushed forward the 
debate about deregulation of labor law standards. There also has been the 
experience involving one of the largest economic recessions after World War II 
at the beginning of the eighties and at the same time a change of the 
governments of the leading European nations such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France. Conservative parties have taken power in these countries 
that are most important economically. Their politicians are more open to 
arguments against all kinds of regulations in the area of the employment and 
state that they reduce the ability of firms to adjust to new market conditions. 
Stiff international competition is said to have increased pressure on enterprises 
to adjust to new market conditions and to create the need for a flexible staff. 
Contracts and laws disturbing this aim should be cut back and in doing so the 
enterprises could adjust labor costs to the developments of competition. This is 
the classical viewpoint of economists since the time of Adam Smith but a 
viewpoint that has had a renaissance with the Friedman economists, the 
monetarists, not only in the US A and nowadays in Canada but also in the above 
mentionned countries. 
1. See OECD, Flexibility in the Labour Market — The Current Debate, Paris, 1986. 
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This viewpoint is heavily opposed by the trade unions. The European trade 
unions generally insist upon statutory rights in labor codes as well as in 
collective bargaining agreements (with a slight exception from the British 
unions due to the different tradition of the British common law). They share 
with European societies in general the understanding that employees should 
have the chance to stay unlimited in an employment relationship2. 
This understanding is backed by the labor law of most European countries 
which usually considers a labor contract as unlimited. This contractual concept 
was established at the beginning of the twentieth century3. But at that time job 
protection rules did not include advance notice requirements only. It was not 
until after World War II that there began a general boom of employment law 
focusing on job security rules in the case of individual dismissals, collective 
dismissals and temporary and fixed term contracts which in a way are a 
circumvention of dismissal laws. 
A closer look at the European scene reveals many common structures of 
national legislation in several countries. It is worth mentioning that this 
common structure of job security legislation in Europe is little influenced by the 
European Common Market Law. In general the Contract of the Common 
Market of Europe supports freedom of trade and commerce rather than social 
aspects in an employment relationship and so do the directives of the European 
Commission4. This gap between commercial and social regulation in the 
Common Market Law has been widely criticized. Due to the critical voices 
particularly on the part of the unions, the European Commission passed a 
directive at the end of the 1970's requiring an advance notice period prior to 
collective dismissals5. But at that time most European countries already had 
such advance notice requirements. Similar job protection measures are on the 
other side more influenced by the International Labor Organization. Most 
European countries have ratified Convention No. 97 of the ILO which obliges 
signatory states to legislate unjust dismissal protections into their domestic 
labor laws. 
This article will briefly describe the treatment of the above mentioned main 
cases of job security in European legislation and jurisdiction. The common 
structure of this legislation explains why there is a common demand for 
2. Policy Review of the Canadian Labour Congress, 1987. 
3. B. HEPPLE (ed.), The Making of Labour Law in Europe — a comparative study of nine 
countries up to 1945, London, New York, 1986. 
4. G. SCHNORR, "European Communities", in R. BALNPAIN, F. MILLARD (ed.), Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations, Deventer, 1982, p. 65. 
5. Mass Dismissal Directive, n° 75, 129, 7.2.1975. 
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deregulation under the sign of "more flexibility"6. In a second step this general 
approach shall be deepened by a presentation of the German job security 
system, the current debate about deregulation of the labor law and the legal acts 
for creating more flexibility in employee staffing. 
1. Job Security for Individuals 
In the case of the dismissal of an individual, most European legislations 
provide the statutory right to employees not to be unfairly dismissed (e.g. 
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, United Kingdom)7. For the dismissal of an 
individual a just cause must be warranted which is described in a most general 
manner in several of the labor codes. Normally the employer has to prove that 
the dismissal was related to certain behaviour such as misconduct or incapacity 
on the part of the individual or is justified because of redundancy. Only if the 
employer is able to prove that the dismissal is "socially warranted" in the 
language of the German Protection against Dismissal Act of 1950 does it then 
apply. 
This act was prepared by an agreement between the unions and the 
employers association and demonstrates the close cooperation between unions 
and employers in the area of social legislation prevailing at that time, a social 
"partnership" ; which in this field soon was gone. This procedure in preparing 
social acts by negotiating details with unions and employers is well known in 
other European countries, for instance in France, the Netherlands or Sueden. 
In France it is common practice since 1968 to prepare social laws by 
negotiations between the employers association and the large unions. The result 
of those negotiations will then be translated by the government into legislation. 
If the social parties do not come to an agreement the government then treatens 
to pass legislation. This was applied for example in 1981 in preparing the later 
Auroux Laws8. 
In the early 1950's conditions generally had been optimal for job security 
legislation in many European countries when the idea of a social welfare policy 
was widely estimated9. In Germany in particular the reputation of the unions 
6. S. BARKIN, "The Flexibility Debate in Western Europe — The Current Drive to restore 
Management's Rights over Personnel and Wages", Industrial Relations, vol. 42,n° 1, 1987, 
p. 12. 
7. B. HEPPLE, "Security of Employment", in R. BLANPAIN, F. MILLARD, supra, note 4, p. 355. 
8. To the French "tripartisme" in general see M. DESPAX, "De l'accord à la loi", Droit social, 
n°3, 1987, p. 184. 
9. G. CLARK, "Remedies for unfair dismissal — a European comparison", International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 20, (1971), p. 397. 
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and their influence on social legislation was strong after the breakdown of the 
fascist system because they had never been affiliated with this system. On the 
other hand, everywhere after the war there existed an immense need for workers 
during the period of the reconstruction of the economy. 
The main issue of the German Anti-Dismissal Act of 1950 is the employers' 
duty to explain to employees the reason for their dismissal. This act finished the 
practice of termination at will which existed before, although the Civil Code of 
1900 had already provided a prior notice requirement. The supervision of the 
proper procedure of dismissals in most European countries is concentrated in 
special labor courts (e.g. Germany, France and Italy) with ajurisdiction besides 
the civil courts. Europeans do not know the practice of arbitration in the area of 
dismissing an individual as is common under collective bargaining legislation in 
the USA and Canadal0 as well as under a few standards pertaining to 
employment legislation in Canada. 
In most of the European countries the vague formula of the "just cause" 
renders the labor courts extremely important due to their power of interpretation. 
They have developped a very sophisticated jurisdiction describing under which 
circumstances a just cause is warranted or not. German courts provide a good 
example in that the German Protection against Dismissals Act has presently 
been reduced to case law and as such is similar to common law practice. At the 
beginning of the 1970's this supervision system of the courts towards the 
dismissal of an individual was supplemented by a stronger supervision of the 
works council — the elected representatives of the workers in the enterprises. 
The works council has to be informed about each dismissal prior to its going 
into effect ' '. 
Under some circumstances it has the right to object to a dismissal. In this 
case the employee may stay in his employment until the labor court has has 
handed down a sentence on the case. Hence labor courts still have the last say, 
but the works council may play a very important role in the background by 
objecting to a dismissal. Such an additional intervention in the procedure of the 
dismissal of an individual may be found in several European countries although 
it is difficult to generalize due to the broad variation of institutional arrangements l2. 
There are two channels to provide additional protection in the dismissal 
10. A.P. RODRIGUEZ, Termination of Employment on the Initiative of the Employer and 
Income Security of the Worker Concerned, 10th International Congress of the International 
Society for Labor Law and Social Society, Washington, 1982, vol. II. 
11. A dismissal without advance notice of the works council has been nullified by the Federal 
Labour Court I ABR III, 74, in International Labour Law Reports, vol. I, 1978. 
12. J. STIEBER, "Protection Against Unfair Dismissal — a comparative view", Comparative 
Labor Law, n° 3, 1980, p. 229. 
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procedure : Either workers representatives are allowed to interfere (relying on 
collective bargaining agreements as in Italy or on codetermination laws as in 
Sueden or Germany) or a governmental institution like the labor inspectorate in 
France. 
On first glance, this control system of dismissals in Europe seems to be very 
striking. But on second glance, labor courts do not form a highly effective 
barrier against dismissals. In general the employers are free to decide who they 
want to lay off and they are able to dismiss instantly. Therefore it is not 
surprising that a German research study of the late 1970's about the job security 
system brought evidence of its little value in practice. After this study (ordered 
by the government) for instance only S % of the dismissed persons during the 
period of one year brought their case to the court. There had been a total 
amount of 1.4 million dismissals a year which was 7 % of the whole workforce. 
Of the 8 % employees who sued against their dismissals only 2 % achieved a 
reinstatement. The overwhelming majority received a lump sum as severence 
pay. This meager result was by no means different when the works council was 
involved. It objected only to 6 % of the cases, that means in most cases the works 
council did not stop the lay off of an individuall3. 
This nationwide study does not relate to the practice of other countries. 
The barrier for lay offs may be higher in some of them. But in general the 
European job security legislation gives the employer considerable flexibility as 
to whom he wants to lay off and at what time. By comparison, job security 
provisions in collective bargaining agreements may restrain the employer more 
sensibly in lay offs due to the strong seniority rules — a restraint which does not 
exist for European employersl4. In spite of greater internal flexibility in the 
selection of persons to be laid-off, European employers complain about their 
dismissal system. But they find their flexibility seriously affected as an employment 
legislation covers the workforce as a whole whereas the collective bargaining 
agreement only applies to the unioniyed segment of the staff. European 
employers' demand for more flexibility aims at accelerating the procedure and 
lowering indemnities for lay offs. In their opinion, the current system delays 
employment adjustment thus increasing their costs with negative influence on 
their competitiveness l5. 
13. V. GESSNER (ed.), Kündigungsschutz und Kuendigungspraxis in der BRD, Hamburg, 
1981. 
14. M. PIORE, "Perspectives on Labor Market Po\icy", Industrial Relations, vo\. 25, n° 2,1986, 
p. 146. 
15. As an example see the Netherlands Council of Employers' Federations, Réduction de la 
durée du travail — le point de vue des employeurs, Bureau International du Travail. Genève, 
n" 1, 1984, p. 107. 
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2. Procedure of Collective Dismissals 
This demand for rapid procedures and lower indemnity costs is not only 
claimed for the dismissal of an individual but also for collective dismissals. In 
the case of collective dismissals all European countries except Switzerland have 
legislation requiring employers to give advanced notification to workers or their 
representativesl6. The legislation requires the workers to be given a minimum 
period of written notice or pay in lieu before terminating their employment. The 
purpose of the notification is to enable management and workers to find out 
whether planned lay-offs can be reduced or avoided and if not, how the costs of 
the workers involved can be offset. 
Several countries also furnish a governmental authorities (e.g. France, 
Netherlands) or the labor office (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg) with 
some power to intervene in collective dismissals. In general they have the power 
to extend the waiting period according to economic circumstances. Laws in 
some countries (though not in Germany) stipulate minimum severance 
payments l7. 
Many countries such as France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany 
have public schemes of income protection and redundancy funds to compensate 
workers for lost wages due to shorter periods of employment. The aim of those 
schemes is to defer or avert dismissals. In Germany income support is part of the 
unemployment insurance system. 
Especially in the 1960's and early 1970's the regulation of collective 
dismissals in Europe was connected with an active manpower policy 18. This 
strategy meant that weaker enterprises were to be phased out rather than 
sustained. The emphasis was therefore on offering relatively continuing 
employment but not necessarily specific employment security in particular 
enterprises. In Germany the phase of an active manpower policy began with 
the change of the government in 1969. One point of this policy was to force 
negotiations between management and workers in the case of plant closings 
and collective lay offs. The works council can demand an agreement on the 
reconciliation of interests which settles the "ifs and hows" of the planned 
measure as well as a social plan which alleviates the negative economic effects 
for the workers 19. Even these rights of the works council cannot ultimately 
16. J. GENNARD, Job Security — Redundancy Agreement and Practices in Selected OECD 
Countries, Paris, OECD, 1985. 
17. See L. LUGO, "Protecting Workers faced with Job Loss due to New Technology, The EEC 
Approach", Comparative Labor Law Journal, vol. 8, n° 2, 1987, p. 183. 
18. R.A. JENNESS, Manpower and Employment Problems and Prospects, Paris, OECD, 1978. 
19. J. SCHREGLE, "Co-Determination in the Federal Republic of Germany — comparative 
view", International Labour Review, 1978, p. 81. 
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prevent dismissals since the economic decisions leading to a cessation of the 
economic operation are taken by the employer alone. There have been 
examples, however, that works councils that consistently make use of their 
rights, can considerably delay plans for the cessation of operations. The 
closure of the Kassel plant of the Dutch-German Enka concern in the midst of 
the 1970's was delayed for more than two years. Usually the works council 
can just partially offset the economic disadvantages for the employees. Social 
plans usually contain redundancy pay for workers having been given notice. 
The amount of these payments depends largely on the negotiating skill of the 
works council and the financial capacity of the company20. 
In the current debate about the deregulation of the dismissal law it is not 
the concept of advance notice prior to collective dismissals that is being 
opposed. 
Critical voices focus on the length of those periods and the costs 
stipulated by the need of severance pay {e.g. Belgium) or by the mandatory 
social plan {e.g. Germany). 
3. Recent Developments in Dismissal Law 
The objections against delay and costs of dismissals due to the European 
employment protection system have caused some changes in European labor 
law legislation over the past years21. But these changes have been limited to 
special aspects of employment protection. The general system of advance 
notice requirements, labor court supervision and public authority intervention 
has been weakened in details but has not been cancelled totally. 
Advanced notice periods for example have been reduced in Belgium22. 
Additionally the law has been restricted where it used to provide the worker 
with severance pay in lieu of notice immediately. Up to 1985 firms had to pay 
a single lump-sum if they failed to give notice previously. Conditions were 
changed then by an act allowing the firms to postpone this mandatory 
severance payment if they were in economic difficulties. 
In the Netherlands the administrative procedures for dismissals are 
slated to be simplified21. And in France it is no longer up to the labor 
20. As an example see W. RYDZY, "Settlement of Labour Disputes in private Industry — The 
Example of Adam Opel AG", in T. HANAMI, R. BLANPAIN, Industrial Conflict Resolution 
in Market Economies, Deventer, Kluwer, 1984, p. 113. 
21. M. KRANKEN, "Deregulating the Employment Relationship: Current Trends in Europe", 
Comparative Labour Law, vol. 7, n° 2, 1986, p. 143. 
22. Loi de redressement contenant des dispositions sociales, 22.1.1985, see European Industrial 
Relation Review, n° 130, 1984, n° 131, 1984. 
23. See Europe sociale, n° I, 1985, p. 87. 
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inspectorate to authorize dismissals. In firms with less than 10 employees, the 
need for an authorization by the labor inspectorate has been abolished. In 
firms with more than 10 employees it has been simply turned into a duty for 
the employer to inform the labour inspectorate of intended dismissals24. 
Also in Germany the 1985 Employment Protection Act did not touch the 
procedure of individual and collective dismissals in general but impaired 
details25. For example : Workers employed in small enterprises with less than 
five workers never had been covered by the job security legislation. But at 
least part-time workers in the past had been counted in the same way as full 
time workers. They are now not being taken into account any more. So small 
firms may be able to manipulate the amount of their employees by hiring only 
part-time workers. In doing so they may circumvent the dismissal law for all 
employees. 
In the area of mass dismissals the framework of mandatory bargaining 
between works council and employer has been reduces. The 1985 act raises 
the percentage of the work force which may be dismissed before the firm is 
obliged to negotiate a social plan with the works council. In addition the 
works council is required to regard the economic circumstances of the firm 
and to minimize the costs for social plans. 
Up to now these changes of traditional structures in European dismissal 
law have been marginal and by far not as profound as one might suppose 
considering the strong criticism of employers. But at the same time secondary 
employment provisions have been developped in European legislation in 
addition to the traditional system creating a group of employees with lower 
dismissal protection. 
4. Farewell to Lifetime Employment 
During the past years many European countries that have changed their 
traditional dismissal law only in details have developped a "second class law" 
for special labor contracts which makes it easier to lay off workers26. These 
laws introduce less restrictive conditions for hiring temporary workers and 
making-up fixed-term contracts thus allowing firms to circumvent traditional 
unlimited contracts with their typical dismissal protection27. Governments 
24. See Europe sociale, n° I, 1987, p. 99. 
25. See Europe sociale, n° I, 1986, p. III. 
26. J. PÉLISSIER, La relation de travail atypique, Report to the IIth International Congress of the 
International Society of Labour Law and Social Security, Caracas, 1985, vol. I, p. 523. 
27. E. CORDOVA, "De l'emploi total au travail atypique, vers un virage dans l'évolution des 
relations de travail?", Revue internationale du travail, vol. 125, n° 6, 1986, p. 715. 
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supporting such a "second class law" have argued that their measures will 
make the labor market more flexible, lower the labor costs of firms and 
induce employers to hire more workers. 
In the United Kingdom a 1985 law doubled the qualifying period for 
unfair dismissal cases (now two years)28. In Italy a 1982 law extended the 
possibilities of using fixed-term contracts, particularly for young people and 
for women by weakening protective legislation29. 
In the Netherlands the maximum permissible length of a fixed-term 
contract is plan stated to be doubled from six months to one year by allowing 
firms to renew these contracts30. 
In Spain temporary help and limited duration contracts were allowed in 
the beginning of the 1980's31. 
French legislation in a 1982 law restrained on the one hand cases for 
fixed-term contracts regulating circumstances under which firms could request 
these types of contracts32. On the other hand a 1985 law extended the 
maximum permissible duration of a fixed term contract from six to twenty 
four months33. 
Also in Germany the government now has eased these flexible forms of 
employment with the Employment Promotion Act of 198534. This act 
facilitates the use of fixed term contracts by allowing such contracts to be 
concluded for up to an eighteen months period without any need for 
justification. This broke the narrow classification of permitted fixed term 
contracts as it was created by the labor courts35. 
Another main aim of the German act is a higher demand for temporary 
workers supplied by temporary service agencies. Labor supplying is rather a 
young business in Germany and has not been practiced but for twenty years 
because it was forbidden before (as it still is in Italy). In Germany, job 
placements are exclusively organized by the labor office and private employment 
agencies are not permitted. But in 1967 the German Constitutional Court 
28. Stt Europe sociale, n° 2, 1986,p. 117. See also P. LEIGHTON, "Atypical Employment — The 
Law and Practice in the United Kingdom", Comparative Labour Law Journal, vol. 8,1986, 
p. 34. 
29. See Europe sociale, n° 3, 1986, p. 83. 
30. See M. VRANKEN, supra, note 21, p. 148. 
31. See Europe sociale, n° 3, 1986, p. 83. 
32. A. JEAMMAUD, "Flexibilité : le procès du droit du travail", in Flexibilité du droit du travail: 
objectif ou réalité, Paris, Éd. Législatives et administratives, 1986. 
33. See Europe sociale, n° 2, 1987, p. 78. 
34. See Europe sociale, n° I, 1986, p. 111. 
35. See S. SIMITIS, "The Juridification of Labor Relations", Comparative Labor Law, vol. 7, 
1986, p. 93. 
U. MAYER Flexibility of Labor Law 241 
admitted the existence of temporary service agencies36. They have been 
regarded as not comparable to private employment agencies if there is a 
permanent employment relationship between the supplying firms and their 
temporary labour staffs. An Act of 1972 granted to the leasing agency the 
status of the employer of the workers it supplies. Agencies need a licence in 
order to do business and are restricted in the duration of the leasing period of 
such staff to a customer. Till 1985 this period could not exceed three months 
in each individual case. This period has been doubled now up to six months. 
The result of this legislation has been a tremendous growth of fixed-term 
contracts, part-time work in general and temporary help service work. 
Part-time work has trebled since 1960 and has nowadays reached about 
10% of the workforce. Almost 90% of part-time workers are women. The 
situation of part-time workers is worse than the situation of full-time 
workers : Less payment and less fringe benefits in individual contracts and 
collective bargaining agreements even if part-time workers are covered by the 
public social security legislation on a prorata basis and by a general anti-
discrimination order in the 1985 law37. 
Recently part-time workers also have been used for work on call. This 
includes a part-time contract with the peculiarity that the work time is not 
determined in advance but instead depends on the actual need of the 
employer at any given time. In retail business, particularly shop assistants and 
those working at cash registers enter this kind of contract. The 1985 legislation 
has set up some minimum employment standards for people working on call. 
Personnel leasing reached its highest level in 1986. Even though only 1 % 
of the work force is engaged in such a triangular employment the economic 
impact is much higher : Employers may thus keep their permanent staff small 
and reduce the permanent work-places because they can at any time order 
additional employees from the leasing companies. 
Fixed-term contracts also contributes to the curtailment of the permanent 
workforce. Those contracts have had an enormous growth since the 1985 act 
in Germany. Meanwhile there has been established a common practice to hire 
employees with a fixed-term contract first, keeping an eye on them if they are 
doing well, and so the firms presently exercise a stronger supervision and 
control of employees behaviour. There is no evidence that fixed-term contracts 
induce employers to hire more workers. They only have changed the hiring 
36. See F. BECKER, "Temporary Work in Germany", in W. ALBEDA, R. BLANPAIN, G. VELDKAMP, 
Temporary Work in Modern Society, Deventer, Kluwer, 1978, vol. I, p. 131. 
37. For the situation in Canada see G. ENGLAND, Part time, casual and other atypical workers 
— a legal view, Kingston, 1987. 
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practice. The unemployment-rate has not fallen during the last years. Up to 
now, the use of fixed-term contracts has not raised the amount of employed 
persons. But workers have been forced to change the status of their employment. 
The employment is no longer based on an unlimited status with a lifetime 
perspective depending on the choice of the employee. Employment is based 
now on limited duration where the choice of an unlimited engagement 
depends on the decision of the employer. That means that the perspective of 
unlimited employment has been strongly affected thus ending substantial 
legal advantages which employees enjoyed under the traditional employment 
protection law. 
5. The Alternative : Equal Employment Standards for All 
The splitting of labor law standards for several groups of employees is 
being heavily opposed by the European trade unions and their affiliated 
political parties38. One reason for a secondary employment law had been the 
long unemployment period which should be brought to an end by a greater 
variety of job contracts. But as unemployment mainly results from the 
replacement of work by new technologies, microelectronics — computer and 
telecomunications technologies have become job killers rather than job 
creaters. On the one hand all parties of the industrial relations system agree 
that the diminished amount of work ought to be shared by a greater number 
of people. The shortening of working hours no longer exclusively serves an 
individual employee's health or personality but it also favours labor market 
policy. 
But as to the practical consequences of this manpower policy, conservative 
governments and unions represent totally different viewpoints. The unions 
try to find a way to have a greater number of people share the reduced amount 
of work which guarantees more equity for all workers. The trade unions in 
Germany as well as those in a number of other European countries seek to 
secure an across-the-board shortening of the working time of all employees 
without any decrease in wages. In addition to extending the annual holiday 
leave an introducing rest pauses there are two particular approaches for 
achieving this aim. 
First there is the issue of shortening the overall working life of individual 
employees either by lowering the age of retirement in general or by providing 
employees the possibility of leaving the production process prematurely. 
38. The European Trade Union Institute, (ed.), Flexibility and Jobs — Myths and Realities, 
Brussels, 1985. 
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Since 1984 there is a special German law which provides employees this 
possibility39. At the age of 58 they can leave the firm prematurely and claim 
for 65% of the wages from the employer. But this possibility exists only if 
there is a collective agreement which regulates the details. The employer shall 
hire another worker for everybody who leaves the firm prematurely. In this 
case the employer gets half of his wage costs back by the employment 
insurance. That means he is not allowed to use the early retirement of his 
workers to reduce his staff. 
But the employment effect of this act did not turn out to be as high as 
suspected. Only 20% of the concerned group of workers who are at least 
58 years old made use of it, i.e. from 1984 to 1986, about 60,000 workers. And 
not each of them was replaced by a new one in the case of early leave (only 
40000). 
Premature retirements are an effort to develop alternative strategies in 
order to avoid lay offs. So a number of European countries encourage 
retirement at an earlier age40. Britain for example has passed special legislation 
similar to German legislation that helps finance early retirement under the 
condition that the firm replaces the retiree with an new employee. The 
retirement age at which employees are provided with a full pension has been 
lowered e.g. in France (down to 60) and the Netherlands (down to 62). 
Since the employment effect of those measures is not overwhelming, in 
most European countries unions, follow a second track in trying to negotiate 
a shortening of the work week. They hold that only decisions banning or 
restricting overtime hours can have an employment effect. In France they 
were supported by the socialist government which reduced the statutory work 
week in 1982 from 40 to 39 hours but widened at the same time the range for 
flexible working hours41. In 1986 the new conservative government tried to 
abolish this legislation. But it failed because proper parliamentary procedure 
had not been respected. Also in the Netherlands in 1985 the 38 hour week was 
introduced by the government following a 1982 negotiation between employers 
and unions. In this agreement the reduction of working time had been 
bargained by conceding a greater variety of working time including 
weekends42. 
39. For more details see M. WEISS, "Federal Republic of Germany", in R. BLANPLAIN (ed.), 
International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Deventer, Kluwer, 
1986, vol. 5, p. 60. 
40. As an example see the Netherlands, Europe sociale, n° 2, 1985, p. 82. 
41. Y. DELAMOTTE, "La loi et la négociation collective en France — Réflexion sur l'expérience 
1981-1985", Industrial Relations, vol. 42, 1987, p. 46. 
42. For the agreement see Bulletin d'informations sociales, n° 2, 1983, p. 240. 
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On the contrary the German government heavily opposed the unions 
fight for a collective bargaining agreement to reduce the work week. In 1984 
German metal industry unions had to stand a long strike of eight weeks before 
they succeeded. At the beginning of 1985, the work week in the metal branch 
was reduced to 38.5 followed by other industries later on. But the unions had 
to concede more flexibility in the working time, the details of which had to be 
bargained between works council and employers. In 1987 metal industry 
unions succeeded in shortening the working time by a new collective agreement 
without a strike. From the beginning of 1989 weekly working hours in this 
industry will be downgraded to 37 hours. 
It is difficult to figure out whether and to what extent the shortening of 
working hours will lead to new jobs or to the prevention of further lay offs 
only. There are many pros and cons in this debate. Some argue that there is no 
employment effect at all by shortening working hours. To them, other market 
conditions — for instance : an expanding economy, the terms of trade and 
monetary exchange — are regarded as the only reliable ways to achieve 
greater employment. But some research studies on the employment effect of 
reduced working hours brought evidence that there is a net effect of this 
measure as creating about 100000 new positions. 
This may be regarded as a poor result but it seems to be the only way in 
the near future to increase the number of people who share the diminished 
amount of jobs under equal conditions. 
Conclusion 
During the past years most European countries have favoured a legislation 
deregulating employment protection standards in order to increase the 
external flexibility of personnel staffing. They have forced legislation which 
provides second class protection for employees in fixed-term contracts in 
triangular relationships or as part-timers. The increasing use of these peripheral 
workers has on the one hand many advantages for the employers by means of 
lower direct and indirect labor costs, e.g. the costs of redundancy payments 
and carrying workers on payrolls during nonproductive periods. But relaxing 
some restrictions on short-term contracts raises on the other hand some 
problems. The growth of peripheral employees bears the danger of reinforcing 
the segragation between "good" core employment characterized by higher 
payment, fringe benefits and job security and "bad" peripheral employment 
characterized by low pay, few if any benefits and no job security. Employees 
are to complete the work at hand as best as they can within the time allotted to 
them. Depending on the falling or increasing workload they are hired for a 
flexible time with less if any job protection. 
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This development of inequity in labor law standards is opposed by the 
unions. They try to protect equity for all employees especially by a collective 
agreement for shortening the statutory work week. This manpower policy of 
the unions might not be sufficient to stop further segmentation of the 
workforce. It has to be completed by the return to an active manpower policy 
of governments including a reinstatement of equal employment protection. 
The German Employment Promotion Act of 1985 for instance is in effect 
only until the end of 1989. After the evaluation of the law's efficiency the 
government has to decide if the act will be cancelled or extended. It is a 
challenge for the unions to influence the government to cancel the act. Should 
the unions succeed in having the act cancelled they could claim to have 
restored more equity in employment. 
